Uncovering High-Level Corruption: Cross-National Objective Corruption Risk Indicators Using Public Procurement Data by Fazekas, Fazekas & Kocsis, G
1 
 
Uncovering high-level corruption: Cross-
national objective corruption risk indicators 
using public procurement data 
Mihály Fazekas (University of Cambrige), Gábor Kocsis (Government 
Transparency Institute) 
Accepted for publication in British Journal of Political Science 
Acceptance date: 11/5/2017 
 
Abstract 
Measuring high-level corruption is subject to extensive scholarly and policy 
interest with moderate progress in the last decade. We develop two objective 
proxy measures of high-level corruption in public procurement: single bidding 
in competitive markets and a composite score of tendering 'red flags'. Using 
official government data of 2.8 million contracts in 28 European countries in 
2009-2014, it directly operationalizes a common definition of corruption: 
unjustified restriction of access to public contracts to favour a certain bidder. 
Corruption indicators are calculated at the contract level, but produce 
aggregate indices consistent with well-established country-level indicators, 
and also validated by micro-level tests. The utility of the novel indicators is 
demonstrated through modelling the effect of red tape on corruption. Data is 
published at www.digiwhist.eu. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Measuring corruption received extensive academic and policy attention due 
to the central role it plays in the quality of democracy, the provision of public 
goods, and economic growth. Some international organisations monitor 
corruption in their member countries or tie funding to corruption ratings. 
Recognising the lack of reliable and actionable corruption indicators, 
repeated calls have been made to develop so-called second generation 
governance indicators better suited to aiding policy making and hypothesis 
testing. However only limited progress has been made.1 
In order to address the lack of actionable corruption indices, we develop 
novel proxy measures of grand corruption which: 1) match a specific 
corruption definition; 2) derive from objective data; 3) allow for consistent 
temporal and cross-country comparisons on large samples; and 4) can be 
validated using alternative corruption proxies.  
We develop the measurement of grand corruption in public procurement as it 
constitutes roughly 30% of government spending in OECD countries, it is a 
data-rich area, and perceived as a corrupt sector. Our domain-specific 
definition of corruption is: “The aim of corruption [in public procurement] is to 
steer the contract to the favoured bidder without detection. This is done in a 
number of ways, including avoiding competition through, e.g., unjustified sole 
sourcing or direct contracting awards; or favouring a certain bidder by 
                                               
1 Knack, Kugler, and Manning 2003; Sequeira 2012. 
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tailoring specifications, sharing inside information, etc.”2 This definition 
focuses attention on restricted and unfair access to public resources, i.e. 
particularism.3 
2. LITERATURE ON MEASURING CORRUPTION 
Available indicators are often inadequate for testing theories of grand 
corruption and developing effective solutions to it. Most corruption indicators 
derive from surveys of attitudes, perceptions and experiences of corruption 
among different stakeholders (e.g. general population, firms, experts); 
reviews of institutional features supposed to control corruption; and audits 
and investigations of individual cases. 
Among perception and attitude surveys, the two most widely used are the 
World Bank’s Control of Corruption4 and Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index5. Both of these have received extensive 
criticism applicable to any similar survey6. Critics point out that perceptions 
may or may not be related to actual experience7. They can be driven by 
general sentiment reflecting, for example, prior economic growth8 or recent 
media coverage of high profile corruption cases9. Perceptions of grand 
                                               
2 World Bank 2009, 7. 
3 Mungiu-Pippidi 2006; North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009; Rothstein and Teorell 2008. 
4 Kaufmann et al 2010. 
5 Transparency International 2012. 
6 Andersson and Heywood 2009; Lambsdorff 2006. 
7 Rose and Peiffer 2015. 
8 Kurtz and Schrank 2007. 
9 Golden and Picci 2005. 
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corruption are even more unreliable than perceptions of everyday corruption 
since experts and citizens have almost no direct experience of it. These 
indicators are typically produced from non-representative surveys, therefore 
representativeness bias is likely to occur (i.e. capturing the views of a 
particular group rather than the whole population), in addition to reflexivity 
bias (i.e. respondents influenced by prior and future measurements) 
exaggerated by small samples10. Furthermore, many such indices vary 
surprisingly little over time in spite of apparent large changes in the 
underlying governance structures suggesting that they are insensitive to 
change11. Surveys of experiences with low-level bribery, such as the Quality 
of Government Institute’s regional survey,12 address some weaknesses of 
perception surveys, while still suffering from others such as non- or false 
response to sensitive questions about bribing. Most importantly, only a tiny 
fraction of the population has direct experience with grand corruption limiting 
the use of this method. 
Reviews of institutions controlling corruption,13 while crucial in understanding 
the determinants of corruption, are, by design, not measuring corruption 
directly. Without a precisely measured outcome variable, they have to rely on 
untested theories of which institutional features work. Scientific analyses and 
audits of individual cases are highly reliable in establishing both petty and 
grand corruption, however, their narrow scope and lack of 
                                               
10 Golden and Picci 2005. 
11 Arndt and Oman 2006. 
12 Charron et al 2014. 
13 Transparency International 2012. 
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representativeness make them of limited use for comparative purposes. In 
addition, data from courts and law enforcement agencies typically cannot be 
compiled to create corruption indices because courts have little capacity to 
investigate large number of cases and there is a high risk of capture in 
corrupt countries. An innovative exception to this general observation is 
Escresa and Picci (2016) who exploit the independence of US courts from 
foreign corrupt groups in enforcing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 
Some authors, recognising the need for further indicators, have developed 
objective corruption proxies which rely on directly observable behaviours that 
likely indicate corrupt behaviour (for an overview see: Fazekas, Tóth, & King, 
2016). These studies investigate corruption in various contexts such as 
elections and high-level politics or welfare services and redistributive 
programs. Many of these innovative indicators are context-dependent and 
are prohibitively expensive to replicate over time and across countries. 
More closely associated with our approach are those studies which focus on 
corruption in public procurement. For example, Golden and Picci (2005) 
propose a new measure of corruption based on the difference between the 
quantity of infrastructure and the related public spending among 20 regions 
in Italy. Our proxies are inspired by authors using red-flags in public 
procurement as proxy measures for corruption such as the use of 
exceptional procedure types14 or single bidding15. 
                                               
14 Auriol et al 2016. 
15 Klasnja 2016. 
6 
 
3. DATA 
The data derives from public procurement announcements in 2009-2014 in 
the EU27 (excluding Malta) and Norway. Announcements appear in the 
Tenders Electronic Daily (TED), which is the online version of the 
'Supplement to the Official Journal of the EU’, dedicated to European public 
procurement16(DG GROWTH, 2015). The data represents a complete 
database of all public procurement procedures conducted under the EU 
Public Procurement Directives in the EU27 plus Norway regardless of the 
funding source (e.g. national, EU funded). All government contracts above 
given value thresholds17 have to follow transparency and procedural rules of 
the Directives with a few exceptions (e.g. some defence contracts). All 
countries’ public procurement legislation is within the framework of the 
Directives, national datasets are therefore directly comparable18. The 
regulation of government contracting in WTO member states and a global 
Open Contracting Data Standard suggest that similar datasets can be 
constructed globally19. 
Data is entered by the procuring organisations into standard reporting forms 
following a common EU reporting guide. The received data is checked by the 
                                               
16 DG GROWTH 2015. 
17 E.g. services contracts above 209 000 EUR in 2016 have to be published in TED. See 
thresholds: https://simap.ted.europa.eu/european-public-procurement.  
18 European Commission 2014. 
19 See reviews: http://digiwhist.eu/publications/towards-a-comprehensive-mapping-of-
information-on-public-procurement-tendering-and-its-actors-across-europe/; 
http://www.open-contracting.org/why-open-contracting/worldwide/ 
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EU’s Publications Office. In spite of this, there is a non-negligible amount of 
missing or nonsensical data. The database used is from the European 
Commission - DG GROWTH20 which conducted further data quality checks 
and enhancements. TED contains variables appearing in 1) calls for tenders 
such as product specification, application deadline, or assessment criteria, 
and 2) contract award notices such as name of the winner, awarded contract 
value, or date of contract signature. For every observed tender, we have 
information from contract award announcements as publication is always 
mandatory, while information from calls for tenders may not be published 
under specific circumstances. 
The TED database contains over 2.8 million contracts of which 2.3 million 
are used in the analysis due to the following exclusions: 1) countries with too 
few observations (Malta), 2) contracts below mandatory reporting thresholds, 
and 3) contracts on non-competitive markets. Database and corruption 
proxies are downloadable: http://digiwhist.eu/resources/data/. 
4. MEASUREMENT MODEL 
This section outlines the measurement logic while full technical details 
including regression specifications are in Annex A.  
The measurement model approximates our corruption definition according to 
which corruption works when legally prescribed principles of open and fair 
competition are circumvented by public officials when designing and running 
tenders in order to recurrently award government contracts to connected 
                                               
20 Download at https://open-data.europa.eu/en/data/dataset/ted-csv  
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companies. Thus, it is possible to identify the output and input sides of the 
corruption process: lack of bidders for government contracts (output) and 
means of fixing the procedural rules for limiting competition (inputs). 
Corruption proxies are obtained by measuring the degree of unjustified 
restriction of competition in public procurement. Such corruption indicators 
signal risk of corruption rather than actual corruption. They are expected to 
be correlated with corrupt exchanges rather than perfectly matching them. 
Such proxy indicators signal corruption only if competition is expected in the 
absence of corruption, hence, markets which are non-competitive under non-
corrupt circumstances had to be excluded (e.g. markets for specialised 
services). Small markets (defined by product group and location) with a low 
number of potential bidders were excluded constituting 8% of contracts, 
underlining that their vast majority concern widely supplied products. 
The simplest indication of restricted competition reflecting our corruption 
definition is when only one bid is submitted for a tender on a competitive 
market (output side) (for further discussion of single bidding see Charron, 
Dahlström, Fazekas, & Lapuente, 2017; Fazekas, Tóth, et al., 2016). This 
typically allows awarding contracts above market prices and extracting 
corrupt rents. Recurrent single bidder tenders between a buyer and a 
supplier allow for developing interpersonal trust underpinning corrupt 
contracting. This is to say that while individual instances of single bidding 
may be explained by a number of non-corrupt reasons (e.g. known most 
productive bidder), recurrent or extensively used single bidder contracts in a 
public organisation or region are more likely to signal corruption and 
restricted access. Hence, the incidence of single bidder contracts (i.e. 
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contracts awarded in procurement tenders where only one bid was 
submitted) is the most basic corruption proxy proposed. 
The more complex indication of corruption also incorporates characteristics 
of the tendering process that are determined by public officials conducting 
the tender and contributing to competition restriction (input side). This 
composite indicator, which we call the Corruption Risk Index (CRI), is a 
simple arithmetic average of individual risk indicators, falling between 0 and 
1, with 1 representing the highest observed corruption risk and 0 the lowest. 
Based on qualitative interviews with public procurement actors, a media 
review and a review of the academic and policy literature, we identified a 
long list of potential ‘red flags’ of corruption and associated corruption 
techniques. ‘Red flags’ are differentiated from ‘green flags’ using statistical 
techniques to avoid over-reliance on a small number of known examples 
disregarding the diversity of public procurement markets. Thus, we 
implemented binary logistic regressions to model the input-output 
relationships between single bidding and other corruption ‘red flags’, also 
containing a wide set of control variables (e.g. buyer sector). Those 
indicators were identified as valid ‘red flags’ which were significant and 
substantive predictors of single bidding. For continuous variables such as 
advertisement period length (days) we defined ‘red flag’ categories using cut-
points in order to capture the non-linear character of corruption, while 
maximizing predictive power. 
This process led to the following CRI components in addition to single 
bidding (descriptive statistics and exact definitions in Annex B and D): 
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1. A simple way to fix tenders is to avoid the publication of the call for 
tenders in the official public procurement journal as this makes it 
harder for non-connected competitors to prepare bids. This is only 
relevant in non-open procedures where publication is voluntary. 
2. While open competition is relatively hard to avoid in some procedure 
types such as open tender, others such as invitation tenders are by 
default less competitive; hence using less open and transparent 
procedure types can indicate the deliberate limitation of competition. 
3. A too short advertisement period (number of days between 
publishing a tender and submission deadline), can inhibit non-
connected bidders in preparing adequate bids while the buyer 
informally informs the favoured bidder about the opportunity ahead of 
time. Alternatively, the advertisement period becomes lengthy due to 
legal challenge which may also signal corruption risks. 
4. Subjective, hard-to-quantify evaluation criteria (e.g. quality of 
company organigram) rather than quantitative or price-related criteria 
allows rigged assessment procedures as it creates room for discretion 
and limits accountability mechanisms. Alternatively, price-only criteria 
can also be abused for corruption when the connected firm bids with 
the lowest price knowing that quality will not be monitored. 
5. If the time used to decide on the submitted bids is excessively 
short or lengthy, it can signal corruption risks. Snap decisions may 
reflect premediated assessment, while long decision period and the 
corresponding legal challenge suggests outright violation of laws. 
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The strength of the single bidder indicator is that it is very simple and easily 
interpreted. However, it is also more prone to gaming by corrupt actors such 
as including fake bidders to mimic competition. For justified purchases of 
highly specific products or when the most productive supplier is known, 
single bidding may over-estimate corruption risks, even though defining 
highly specific purchases to match the specific characteristics of connected 
bidders is a major form of corrupt contracting. 
The strength of the composite indicator approach is a more complete 
monitoring of the corrupt contracting process, while it also explicitly tries to 
abstract from diverse market realities to capture underlying corruption 
techniques. It allows for ‘red flag’ definitions to change from context to 
context in order to capture similar levels of risk irrespective of the detailed 
forms of corruption techniques used (e.g. non-corrupt competitive conditions 
imply tighter submission deadlines in the Netherlands than in Greece, hence 
corrupt behaviour would reflect deviations from slightly different normal 
benchmarks). This flexibility in corruption indices aims to assure that the 
same level of risk is associated with a similar level of actual corruption in a 
comparative perspective. As corruption techniques are likely to change over 
time, tracking multiple corruption strategies in one composite score is most 
likely to remain consistent. Both of these characteristics underpin its 
usefulness for international and time-series comparative research. The main 
weakness of CRI is that it can only capture a subset of corruption strategies, 
arguably the simplest ones, hence it misses out on sophisticated types of 
corruption such as corruption combined with inter-bidder collusion. As long 
as simplest strategies are the cheapest, they likely represent the most 
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widespread forms of corrupt behaviour. However, it is admitted that more 
sophisticated corruption techniques are more likely to be used when 
monitoring institutions are stronger, implying that the level of corruption may 
be under-estimated in less corrupt countries. Further research should 
expand on the set of red flags tracked and evaluate the interaction between 
monitoring institutions, regulatory complexity, and corruption sophistication in 
order to more precisely estimate corruption. 
5. REGRESSION RESULTS 
The above described binary logistic regression model was implemented in 6 
specifications to show the independent effect of each ‘red flag’ on single 
bidding (models 1-5) and their combined effect (model 6) (Table 1). 
Descriptive statistics of the dependent variable (single bidding) can be found 
in Annex C. These highlight the wide variation in single bidding practice 
across Europe. 
The hypothesised relationships between single bidding and corruption 
techniques are supported by estimation results. In a database encompassing 
enormous diversity across 28 countries and 6 years in 2.3 million contracts, 
our simple regression models perform well by explaining 13-15% of variance 
in single bidding. 
Not publishing the call for tenders in the official journal (TED) increases the 
average probability of single received bid in every regression by 12-18 
percent, which is one of the strongest impacts across all models. Non-open 
procedure types carry a higher corruption risk than open procedures in terms 
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of the probability of single bid in all our models: they are associated with 14-
19 percent higher single bid probability. Evaluation criteria behaves as 
expected with both price-only and the excessive use of non-quantitative 
criteria carrying corruption risks: risky criteria are associated with 4 percent 
higher probability of single bidding across the different models compared to 
the reference category. Extremely short or lengthy advertisement periods are 
associated with about 1% higher probability of a single bid received across 
the different models compared to the normal or typical advertisement 
periods. Extremely short or long decision periods are estimated to increase 
the probability of single bidding by 3-6% compared to typical decision period 
lengths. While some of these average estimated effects seem small, they 
only reflect the Europe-wide relationship, in specific countries some ‘red 
flags’ impacts are considerably stronger than in others. 
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Table 1. Binary logistic regression results on contract level, 2009-2014, EU27+Norway, average marginal effects reported, N=1,306,025, all 
regressions contain control variables: buyer sector, buyer type, year, product market, contract value, country 
Dependent variable single bid=1 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) 
no call for tender 
published 
0.182** 
    
0.120** 
 
(0.000) 
    
(0.000) 
restricted procedure 
 
0.188** 
   
0.141** 
  
(0.000) 
   
(0.000) 
risky evaluation criteria 
  
0.038** 
  
0.039** 
   
(0.000) 
  
(0.000) 
extreme submission 
period    
0.008** 
 
0.014** 
    
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
extreme decision 
period     
0.034** 0.057** 
     
(0.000) (0.000) 
R-squared 0.143 0.145 0.135 0.135 0.136 0.151 
Note: p-values in parentheses;*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01;  
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Based on these regression results and theory, we could identify ‘red flags’ of 
corruption: single bidding and further components of the CRI. For simplicity, 
each ‘red flag’ is weighted equally making CRI a simple arithmetic average of 
its components. Additivity reflects the interchangeability of different 
corruption techniques used to achieve corrupt deals and that more ‘red flags’ 
mark a contracting process which is more in line with our corruption model, 
that is making corruption more likely to occur. Nevertheless, it is once again 
underlined that sophisticated corrupt actors may only need to use only one of 
the measured corruption techniques to render a procedure corrupt, making 
the composite score a lower bound estimate of true corruption risks. 
Component weights are normed so that CRI falls between 0 and 1 (i.e. 
weights were set at 1/6). Such a simple weighting allows easy interpretability 
of changes in CRI scores, i.e. changes can be thought of in terms of 
additional ‘red flags’. 
6. VALIDATING THE CORRUPTION PROXIES 
The validity of single bidder and CRI indicators stems from their 
correspondence with the definition of high-level corruption in public 
procurement and the fitted regression models. Analysis of their association 
with micro-level objective corruption proxies and with widely used survey-
based macro-level corruption indicators further underpin their validity, i.e. 
suggest that they proxy corruption rather than other phenomena such as low 
administrative capacity. Main results are discussed here, additional validity 
tables can be found in Annex B. 
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First, we test validity through two micro-level objective risk indicators: 
procurement suppliers’ country of origin and contract prices. It is expected 
that a contract represents a higher corruption risk if it is awarded to a 
company registered in a tax haven as secrecy allows for hiding corrupt 
money21. As expected, across EU27 plus Norway there is a marked and 
significant difference in corruption risks of contracts won by foreign 
companies registered in tax havens versus those which are not: 0.28 versus 
0.26 for single bidding; 0.34 versus 0.31 for CRI (Ncontract=28,642). 
We also expect corruption to drive prices up. Although reliable unit prices are 
not available across many sectors, we can employ an alternative indicator of 
price, which is the ratio of actual contract value to initially estimated contract 
value22. As expected, both single bidder contracts and a higher CRI are 
associated with higher prices. Single bidder contracts have between 9-9.6% 
higher prices than multiple bidder contracts. Contracts with one additional 
red flag (i.e. 1/6 CRI points higher) are 2.5-2.7% more pricey after controlling 
for major confounding factors (Table 2). To complement the full population 
estimations with more reliable, but small sample price information, we 
manually collected unit price information from procurement announcements 
for new computed tomography scanners (CT machines) and new highway 
and road construction. Both tests support validity. 
                                               
21 Shaxson and Christensen 2014. 
22 Coviello and Mariniello 2014. 
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Table 2. Linear regressions explaining relative contract value and unit prices, EU27+NO, 2009-2014 
Dependent variables 
Relative contract value (contract 
price/estimated price) 
eur/CT machine eur/km 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) 
Independent variables 
Single 
bidder 
CRI 
Single 
bidder 
CRI 
Single 
bidder 
CRI CRI CRI 
 0.0963** 0.1484** 0.0903** 0.1607** 557,505* 881,525+ 7,854,589+ 7,561,906+    
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.10) (0.06) (0.10)    
Buyer sector N Y N Y N N N N 
Buyer type N Y N Y Y Y N N 
Year N Y N Y Y Y Y N 
Product market  N Y N Y N N N N 
Contract value N Y N Y N N N N 
Country Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
CT machine quality     Y Y   
Terrain ruggedness       N Y 
Construction sector price 
level 
      N Y 
N 524442 501784 524441 501783 68 68 73 62 
R-squared 0.1096 0.1546 0.0710 0.1248 0.32 0.284 0.188 0.165 
Note: p-value in parentheses; +p < 0.1,*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01; each regression contains constant; relative contract values equal or smaller than 1 
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While corruption perceptions are considered to be too sticky and biased to 
adequately capture changes in corruption, they are more reliable for comparing 
levels of corruption across countries for a longer time period23. Hence, correlating 
levels of subjective and objective corruption indicators by country can provide a 
further validity test. The 2009-2013 country average single bidder and CRI indicators 
correlate as expected with widely used perception-based corruption indicators such 
as Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (coefficients are around 
0.6). A 2013 Eurobarometer survey of bidding companies’ experience of corruption 
across the EU provides the most directly comparable survey-based indicator of 
corruption in public procurement (Standard Eurobarometer 79). Higher values 
indicate higher reported experience of corruption, hence moderate positive linear 
correlation coefficients (0.56-0.62) also support indicator validity. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
This article developed two objective proxies of high-level corruption: a simple 
indicator – single bidding – and a complex indicator – CRI. Both indicators have 
been validated by their direct fit with our corruption definition, an empirical model of 
corrupt rent extraction, and a range of external validity test. 
The great advantage of our approach is that a large amount of data is already 
available for research across high, middle and low income countries, starting from 
about 2008. Such data is being generated on a daily basis by national procurement 
systems adding to databases automatically on a real-time basis at no additional cost. 
As the proposed corruption risk indicators are calculated on the transaction level 
they also allow a move away from country-level analysis to look into regions, sectors, 
                                               
23 Escresa and Picci 2016. 
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organisations, or individual persons’ behaviour long advocated as necessary for 
advancing the field. Such large volumes of internationally comparative micro-level 
data open up a new horizon for comparative research on corruption and quality of 
institutions more broadly. Subsequent research could benefit from using corruption 
proxies which avoid subjective indicators’ biases and the context-bound nature of 
most objective indices. Using corruption proxies which are sensitive to change allow 
for better assessing interventions and testing theories of institutional change such as 
the impact of increasing salaries on corruption or electoral accountability and 
corruption at the municipal level, to name a few. 
The proposed corruption proxies can also be used in policy for understanding what 
works in anticorruption. They can be used to evaluate single regulatory or 
organisational changes such as tightening reporting requirements or introducing 
organisational integrity management. They could also guide regulators in where to 
spend their limited resources for conducting audits. In addition, corruption proxies 
can be made available to citizens, NGOs and journalists to hold governments 
accountable. 
In order to increase the reliability and validity of corruption risk measurement, further 
research could identify and measure additional corruption risk techniques as more 
data becomes available; and it could also use more advanced analytics to 
differentiate justified instances of competition restriction such as product specificity 
from unjustified, favouritistic cases.
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ANNEXES 
ANNEX A – FULL DESCRIPTION OF THE MEASUREMENT MODEL  
Our approach builds on prior work with similar datasets making use of a range of 
public procurement ‘red flags’24. The measurement model directly approximates our 
corruption definition according to which corruption works when legally prescribed 
principles of open and fair competition are circumvented by public officials during the 
implementation of procurement rules in order to recurrently award government 
contracts to companies belonging to the particularistic network. By implication, it is 
possible to identify the output and input sides of the corruption process: lack of 
bidders for government contracts (output) and means of fixing the procedural rules 
for limiting competition (inputs).25 By measuring the degree of unjustified restriction 
of competition in public procurement, proxy indicators of corruption can be 
obtained.26 The identified corruption indicators, however, only signal risk of 
corruption rather than actual corruption. They are expected to be correlated with 
corrupt exchanges rather than perfectly matching them. 
Such proxy indicators signal corruption risks only if competition is to be expected in 
the absence of corruption on the markets in question. This implies that markets 
                                               
24 (Charron et al., 2017; Fazekas, Cingolani, et al., 2016; Klasnja, 2016). 
25 These inputs of the corrupt tendering process represent process design choices of public buyers as 
their decisions are indispensable for corruption to occur. Of course, companies must be complicit too, 
even though they cannot by law design procurement tenders. 
26 Corruption can also be achieved in the post award phase which necessitates contract modification 
(e.g. increasing contract value) which is a more costly form of corruption as there are stringent rules 
on contract renegotiations all across Europe. This is to say that some forms of corruption are naturally 
not captured by our indicators, still the expectation is that the biggest part is captured. 
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which are non-competitive under non-corrupt circumstances have to be excluded 
such as markets for specialised services. In order to identify markets which are non-
competitive by nature, we relied on market size as measured by number of contracts 
awarded. Markets with less than 10 contracts awarded in 2009-201427 were 
considered as likely not able to sustain multiple competing firms even under non-
corrupt circumstances. Markets were defined by a matrix of product groups (CPV28 
categories at level 3) and geographical location of contract performance (NUTS29 
regions at level 2). This condition excluded 8% of all awarded contracts, underlining 
that the vast majority of government purchases concern widely supplied goods and 
services. 
The simplest indication of restricted competition in line with our theoretical definition 
is when only one bid is submitted30 in a tender on an otherwise competitive market. 
                                               
27 In the absence of company identifiers in the EU‐wide public procurement dataset to actually 
calculate the number of different competing firms, we derived the contract number cut-off point by 
analysing the United Kingdom subsample where we manually assigned company IDs by matching 
names and addresses to official registry records. Cross tabulating number of contracts awarded on 
the market and the number of different companies supplying the UK government shows that  the 
number of markets with less than 2 companies drops below 5% among markets with at least 11 
contracts awarded, with the average number of companies steadily increasing as the number of 
contracts increase. Hence taking 10 contracts per market is a conservative cut‐point for identifying 
competitive markets with multiple potential suppliers. 
28 CPV=Common Procurement Vocabulary. For more info see: http://simap.europa.eu/codes-and-
nomenclatures/codes-cpv/codes-cpv_en.htm 
29 NUTS=Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics. For more info see: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/nuts_nomenclature/introduction  
30 According to correspondence with DG GROWTH officials, TED may contain the number of valid 
bids, that is after inadequate bids are rejected, rather than the number of submitted bids in some 
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This typically allows the awarding of contracts above market prices and extracting 
corrupt rents (output side). In addition, recurrent single bidder tenders between a 
buyer and a supplier allow for developing interpersonal trust underpinning corrupt 
contracting. This is to say that while individual instances of single bidding may be 
explained by a number of non-corrupt reasons, recurrent or extensively used single 
bidder contracts in a public organisation or region are more likely to signal corruption 
and restricted access. Hence, the incidence of single bidder contracts awarded (i.e. 
contracts awarded in procurement tenders where only one bid was received by the 
contracting authority) is the most basic corruption proxy we propose. 
The more complex indication of high-level corruption also incorporates 
characteristics of the tendering process that are in the hands of public officials who 
conduct the tender and contribute to competition restriction (input side). This 
composite indicator, which we call the Corruption Risk Index (CRI), is defined as 
follows: 
 CRIi = Σj wj * CIj i  (1) 
 Σj wj = 1 (2) 
 0 ≤ CRIi ≤ 1 (3) 
 0 ≤ CIji ≤ 1 (4) 
                                                                                                                                                  
cases as the official guidance documents are not clear enough. Using the number of submitted bids 
rather than valid bids leads to an underestimation of corruption risks as excluding all but one bid on 
administrative grounds such as a missing stamp from one of the certificates, represents a corruption 
technique on its own (Fazekas, Tóth, et al., 2016). 
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where CRIi stands for the corruption risk index of contract i, CIj i represents the jth 
elementary corruption indicator observed in the tender of contract i, and wj 
represents the weight of elementary corruption indicator j. Elementary corruption 
indicators or ‘red flags’ can be either corruption inputs or outputs. CRI = 0 indicates 
minimum corruption risk while CRI=1 denotes maximum corruption risk observed.  
Based on qualitative interviews with participants of public procurement tenders, a 
media review and a review of the academic and policy literature, we identified a long 
list of potential ‘red flags’ of corruption and the associated corruption techniques. 
Qualitative interviews were carried out with public procurement practitioners ‘close’ 
to corrupt transactions to identify widely used corruption techniques, to explore the 
underlying rationale for each of them, and to gather specific examples (without 
concrete names). We conducted 54 semi-structured interviews each lasting for about 
1-1.5 hours in 5 countries: Germany, Italy, Hungary, Sweden, and the UK. 
Interviewees covered all three major actor categories in public procurement (issuers, 
bidders, and advisors). They work in construction, healthcare, and IT services 
sectors taking part in projects ranging from large infrastructure projects of millions of 
EUR to small services contracts of few thousand EUR.  
The media review entailed content analysis of articles appearing in 9 major online 
newspapers in Hungary between 2008 and 2015. Relevant articles were identified by 
standard keyword search in the online portals’ archives using a range of words 
relating to corruption and public procurement. The so-identified sample then was 
manually checked to select those cases which contain concrete enough information 
to identify corruption techniques or ‘red flags’. Eventually, 47 relevant articles were 
used for detailed corruption technique mapping. 
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The review of the literature encompassed widely cited academic papers reviewing 
corruption measurement and research papers using public procurement corruption 
proxies similar to ours; while we also reviewed the policy literature on corruption 
prevention, corruption identification and in general good practice guides31(Chong, 
Klien, & Saussier, 2015; Klasnja, 2016; OECD, 2007; Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 
2013; Sequeira, 2012; Transparency International, 2006; World Bank, 2009).  
Full list of corruption red flags identified based on these diverse sources can be 
found in (Fazekas, Cingolani, & Tóth, 2016). These indicators range from tender 
announcement through contract award to contract implementation. Many of which 
cannot currently be reliably calculated on the EU-wide TED dataset, while further 
data collection work will be able to generate the detailed data needed for some 
additional indicators.  
‘Red flags’ had to be reliably differentiated from ‘green flags’32 using statistical 
techniques to avoid the usual trap of ‘red flag’ approaches which are driven by a 
small number of known examples disregarding the diversity of public procurement 
markets. We implemented binary logistic regression models in order to directly 
model the input-output relationships between corruption ‘red flags’ and statistically 
differentiate between reliable ‘red flags’ and ‘green flags’. Binary logistic regression 
                                               
31 Chong, Klien, and Saussier 2015; Klasnja 2016; OECD 2007; Pricewaterhouse Coopers 2013; 
Sequeira 2012; Transparency International 2006; World Bank 2009. 
32 Green flags are considered those characteristics or combination of characteristics of the tendering 
process which are widely associated with good practices of open and fair competition such as leaving 
a sufficiently long time period for bidders to prepare their bids or defining tender specifications in 
producer neutral, generic terms which allow for technologically different but functionally equivalent 
products to compete. 
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is preferable over standard techniques used for measuring latent variables such as 
PCA or SEM because, it allows for isolating the effect of interchangeable corruption 
techniques rather than assuming they are all correlated, it also provides an efficient 
framework for dealing with non-linearities, moreover it also allows for using control 
variables which are not meant to be ‘red flags’ still influence single bidding 
probability. Regression analysis is predominantly meant to capture systematic 
associations between inputs and outputs of the corrupt contracting process reflecting 
the corrupt groups’ control, while they may also reflect some causal relationships. 
The following model was estimated:  
  (5) 
 iimmijji CRZ   410  (6) 
where single bidderi equals 1 if the ith contract awarded had only one bidder and 0 if 
it has more; Zi represents the logit of a contract being a single bidder contract; β0 is 
the constant of the regression; Rij is the matrix of j corruption ‘red flags’ for the ith 
contract such as length of advertisement period; Cim stands for the matrix of m 
control variables for the ith contract such as the number of competitors on the 
market; εi is the error term; and β1j, and β4m represent the vectors of coefficients for 
explanatory and control variables. 
Each regression includes the full list of control variables except for one (model 6 in 
Table 2). Control variables account for the most important alternative explanations to 
our conceptualised corrupt outcome such as low administrative capacity and product 
market idiosyncrasies, in particular: (1) institutional endowments measured by type 
(e.g. municipal, national) and sector (e.g. education, healthcare) of contracting body, 
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(2) differences in technology and market standards proxied by type of product 
procured using 40 different CPV divisions (e.g. financial services, construction 
works), (3) differences due to contract size and complexity indicated by contract 
value (logarithm, EUR), and (4) institutional framework as proxied by country and 
year of contract award. Once again, we run our regressions only on competitive 
markets. Descriptive statistics for these variables can be found in Annex C. 
A logically equivalent, but practically different approach was used for identifying ‘red 
flags’ in categorical and continuous variables using the above regression model in 
each of the 28 countries analysed. For categorical variables, those categories were 
denoted as ‘red flags’ which turned out to be significant and substantial predictors of 
single bidding compared to the available most transparent and competitive category 
(e.g. open procedure in the case of procedure types contracting bodies can use 
when procuring). ‘Red flags’ in continuous variables were identified in an iterative 
process: first, a model was fitted using the linear continuous predictor; second, two 
discrete jumps in residual values were identified using residual distribution graphs. 
These discrete jumps or thresholds represent the points beyond which the probability 
of single bidding drastically changes. We looked for two thresholds for each 
continuous variable because both extremes of the distributions could represent high 
risk such as in the case of decision periods where snap decisions as well as 
unusually lengthy decisions could signal corruption albeit for slightly different 
reasons. While the exact threshold values may contain a certain degree of 
professional judgement, the fact that they enter into the regression models as 
significant and substantial predictors provides substantial evidence for their validity. 
In order to preserve the full population of observations, we always included a missing 
category in every corruption input. In some cases, missing values predicted single 
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bidding suggesting that concealing relevant tender information from bidders or the 
wider public served as a corruption technique, hence deserved to be included as ‘red 
flag’. Risky categories and thresholds also differ by country reflecting the diverse 
market norms for contracting entities and bidding firms (e.g. high risk short 
advertisement period in Greece was up to 44 days, while only up to 27 days in the 
UK). Such diversity of ‘red flag’ definitions is supposed to capture the underlying 
corruption technique within each context by abstracting from different environmental 
conditions and norms.33 The full definition of country-specific ‘red flags’ can be found 
in Appendix D. 
After testing each red flag available in the EU-wide dataset and validated by prior 
research34, we derived the following comparatively valid reliably computable 
components of CRI in addition to single bidding (overview in Table 1, descriptive 
statistics and exact definitions in Annex B and D): 
1. A simple way to fix tenders is to avoid the publication of the call for tenders in 
the official public procurement journal (Tenders Electronic Daily (TED)) as this 
would make it harder for non-connected competitors to get informed about the 
opportunity and hence to prepare their bids. This is only relevant in non-open 
procedures where publication is up for decision as in open procedures 
publication is mandatory. 
2. While open competition is relatively hard to avoid in some tendering 
procedure types such as open tender, others such as invitation tenders or 
                                               
33 As predicting the incidence of single bidding defined ‘red flags’, higher as well as lower frequency of 
risky categories per country resulted avoiding the problem of selecting only the outliers in the 
distributions more or less representing the same proportion of contracts in each country. 
34 (Charron et al., 2017). 
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direct contracting are by default less competitive because they allow for 
picking directly who can submit bids. By implication, using less open and 
transparent procedure types can indicate the deliberate limitation of 
competition and favouring a connected bidder, that is corruption risks. 
3. If the advertisement period, i.e. the number of days between publishing a 
tender and the submission deadline, is too short for preparing an adequate 
bid, it can serve corrupt purposes whereby the contracting body informally 
tells the favoured company about the opportunity ahead of time allowing it to 
properly prepare its bid. Alternatively, when the advertisement period 
becomes lengthy, it may also signal corruption risks because often legal 
challenge against the call for tenders specification or the chosen procedure 
type lies behind (e.g. an excluded company challenging the exclusion criteria 
set out in the call for tenders, as was the case in the European Commission 
vs Hungarian Government case regarding criteria used in highway 
construction tenders35). 
4. Different types of evaluation criteria are prone to manipulation to different 
degrees, subjective, hard-to-quantify criteria such as the quality of company 
organigram rather than quantitative or price-related criteria often accompany 
rigged assessment procedures as it creates room for discretion and limits 
accountability mechanisms. In some cases, nevertheless, price-only criteria 
can also be abused for corrupt goals whereby the well-connected firm bids 
with the lowest price knowing that quality will not be monitored thoroughly or a 
contract modification will allow for charging higher prices. 
                                               
35 
http://akadalymentes.kormany.hu/download/c/c0/30000/K%C3%B6zlem%C3%A9ny_alkalmass%C3
%A1g_2014_12_02%20(2).pdf  
30 
 
5. If the time used to decide on the submitted bids is excessively short or 
lengthy, it can signal corruption risks. Snap decisions may reflect premediated 
assessment, that is when there was no serious consideration of bids because 
the winner was already known. A long decision period is often due to a legal 
challenge mounted against the decision making process or the initial award 
decision whereby the announcement of the final, binding award decision is 
delayed until the first instance court or arbitration board reached a conclusion. 
In such cases the suggested outright violation of laws is the foundation for 
defining corruption risks. 
Table A1. Overview of corruption ‘red flags’ 
Proc. phase Indicator name Indicator values 
Submission 
Call for tenders 
publication (non-
open procedures) 
0=call for tender published in official 
journal  
1=NO call for tender published in 
official journal 
Procedure type 
0=open 
1=non-open (accelerated, restricted, 
award without publication, negotiated, 
tender without competition) 
Length of 
advertisement 
period 
Number of days between the 
publication of call for tenders and the 
submission deadline 
Assessment Evaluation criteria 
Sum of weights for evaluation criteria 
which are NOT related to prices and 
quantitative requirements36 
                                               
36 In TED, information on award criteria was available in an unstructured text variable along with the 
weight of each criterion. Applying text mining techniques, looking for keywords such as price, cost, 
wage, etc., we calculated the weight of quantitative criteria standardized between 0 and 100, 0 
meaning no quantitative criteria was considered in the awarding process, 100 implying that there was 
only quantitative criteria considered. In those countries, when there were too few contracts with 
qualitative information on weights (i.e. texts for text mining), we used a binary variable available in 
every contract award announcement which takes value 0 if “Most economically advantageous tender” 
and 1 if “Lowest price” criteria was used. 
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Length of decision 
period 
Number of days between submission 
deadline and announcing contract 
award 
Outcome 
Single bidder 
contract 
(valid/received) 
0=more than 1 bid received 
1=1 bid received 
Each of the two corruption risk indicators, single bidding and CRI, have its pros and 
cons. The strength of the single bidder indicator is that it is very simple and 
straightforward to interpret. However, it is also more prone to gaming by corrupt 
actors due to its simplicity such as including fake bidders to mimic competition. In the 
case of justified purchases of highly specific products, single bidding may over-
estimate corruption risks, even though defining highly specific purchases to match 
the specific characteristics of the connected bidder is reportedly a major form of 
corrupt contracting. 
The strength of the composite indicator approach (CRI) is that it explicitly tries to 
abstract from diverse market realities to capture the underlying corruption 
techniques. It allows for ‘red flag’ definitions to change from context to context in 
order to capture similar levels of risk irrespective of the detailed forms of corruption 
techniques used (e.g. normal competitive conditions imply tighter submission 
deadlines in the Netherlands than in Greece, hence corrupt behaviour would reflect 
deviations from slightly different normal benchmarks). This flexibility in corruption 
indices aims to assure that the same level of risk is associated with a similar level of 
actual corruption in a comparative perspective. In addition, as corruption techniques 
used at any point in time are likely to be diverse, tracking multiple possible corruption 
strategies in one composite score is most likely to remain consistent even if the 
composition of underlying corruption techniques changes. Both of these 
characteristics underpin its usefulness for international and time-series comparative 
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research. The main weakness of CRI is that it can only capture a subset of 
corruption strategies, arguably the simplest ones, hence it misses out on 
sophisticated types of corruption such as corruption combined with inter-bidder 
collusion. As long as simplest strategies are the cheapest for corrupt groups, they 
are likely to represent the most widespread forms of corrupt behaviour. However, it is 
admitted that more sophisticated corruption techniques are more likely to be used 
when monitoring institutions are stronger, implying that the level of corruption may be 
under-estimated in less corrupt countries. Further research should expand on the set 
of red flags tracked and evaluate the interaction between monitoring institutions, 
regulatory complexity, and corruption sophistication in order to more precisely 
estimate corruption. 
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ANNEX B – ADDITIONAL VALIDITY TESTS 
Table B1: Bivariate Pearson correlations of % single bidder and the CRI with 
survey-based corruption indicators, on the country level, 2009-2013 
Indicator 
Single 
bidder 
CRI N 
WGI - Control of Corruption (2013) -0.7120* -0.6933* 28 
TI- Corruption Perceptions Index (2013) -0.6903* -0.6662* 28 
GCI - Favouritism in decisions of government 
officials (2013) 
-0.7003* -0.6342* 28 
Eurobarometer company corruption 
perceptions (2013) 
0.5645* 0.6163* 25 
Note: * = significant at the 5% level 
34 
 
 
Table B2: Correlation between individual components of CRI and corruption 
perceptions, 2009-2013, EU27 pus Norway 
 
 
Variable 
Single 
bidder No CFT 
Procedure 
type 
Weight of 
non-price crit. 
Adv. 
period 
Dec. 
period 
WGI - Control of Corruption (2013) -0.7120 -0.1350 -0.0954 -0.3634 -0.1715 -0.1206 
TI - Corruption Perceptions Index 
(2013) -0.6903 -0.1323 -0.0832 -0.3525 -0.1731 -0.1118 
GCI - Favouritism in decisions of 
government officials (2013) -0.7003 -0.1223 -0.0444 -0.3962 -0.0209 -0.1359 
N 28 28 25 27 25 28 
Eurobarometer company 
corruption perceptions (2013) 0.5645 -0.0658 -0.1308 0.4002 0.1406 0.1819 
N 25 25 23 24 22 25 
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ANNEX C – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF CORRUPTION ‘RED FLAGS’ 
Table C1. Descriptive statistics of corruption inputs, 2009-2014, EU27 plus 
Norway 
 
mean min max sd N 
Single bidder contract 0.232 0.00 1.00 0.42 1892421 
Call for tender not published in official 
journal 
0.387 0.00 2.00 0.64 2381467 
Length of submission period in days 44.358 1.00 784 20.48 1661258 
Relative price of tender 
documentation 
0.849 0.3 1 0.17 542613 
Weight of non-price evaluation criteria 47 0.00 100 31.39 992329 
Length of decision period in days 87.06 1 31851 101.89 1544507 
 
Figure C1. Average % single bidding contracts by country, 2009-2014, EU27 
plus Norway 
46%
43%
31%
29%
29%
28%
27%
26%
24%
21%
20%
19%
19%
18%
17%
16%
14%
12%
11%
10%
10%
9%
8%
7%
6%
5%
4%
3%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
PL
HR
SK
CY
EE
HU
IT
GR
CZ
BG
SI
RO
LV
LT
PT
ES
FR
BE
DE
AT
LU
FI
NO
NL
DK
SE
UK
IE
 
 
 
36 
 
Figure C2. Average % single bidding contracts by product group (CPV 
divisions), 2009-2014, EU27 plus Norway 
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Table C2. Distribution of procedure type, 2009-2014, EU27 plus Norway 
Type of procedure type followed N % 
Accelerated negotiated procedure 4,253 0.18 
Accelerated restricted procedure 12,780 0.54 
Award without publication 60,198 2.53 
Competitive dialogue 3,664 0.15 
Negotiated with competition 107,701 4.52 
Negotiated without competition 51,942 2.18 
Open 1,997,843 83.89 
Restricted 127,336 5.35 
Missing/error 15,750 0.66 
Total 2,381,467 100 
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ANNEX D – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF CONTROL VARIABLES 
Table D1. Descriptive statistics of log contract value, 2009-2014, EU27 plus 
Norway 
Variable name mean min max sd N 
log real contract value 10.866 5.14 23.03 2.43 1,678,656 
 
Table D2. Distribution of issuer type, 2009-2014, EU27 plus Norway 
Type of issuer N % 
Central government 190,387 7.99 
Local authorities 558,596 23.46 
Water, energy, transport, and 
telecom 
145,029 8.09 
EU institutions 8,416 0.35 
Body governed by public law 695,618 29.21 
National or federal Agency/Office 43,708 1.84 
Regional or local Agency/Office 52,859 2.22 
Other 550,01 23.10 
Missing 136,844 5.57 
Total 2,381,467 100 
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Table D3. Distribution of issuer main sector, 2009-2014, EU27 plus Norway 
Main sector of issuer N % 
Defence 46,082 1.94 
Economical 30,860 1.30 
Education 120,841 5.07 
Electricity 37,303 1.57 
Environment 39,830 1.67 
General public services 420,814 17.67 
Health 779,992 32.75 
Housing 68,893 2.89 
Missing 197,444 8.29 
Other 256,511 10.77 
Port/airport-related 7,500 0.31 
Postal 15,286 0.64 
Production 7,563 0.32 
Public order 28,274 1.19 
Railway 35,841 1.50 
Recreation 12,494 0.52 
Social 19,189 0.81 
Water 9,968 0.42 
Missing 246,782 10.36 
Total 2,381,467 100 
 
Table D4. Distribution of contract award year, 2009-2014, EU27 plus Norway 
Year of contract award N % 
2009 339,386 14.25 
2010 376,224 15.80 
2011 401,016 16.84 
2012 417,897 17.55 
2013 418,965 17.59 
2014 427,979 17.97 
Total 2,381,467 100.00 
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Table D5. Distribution of main market of contract, 2009-2014, EU27 plus 
Norway 
Main market of contract N % 
Agricultural, farming, fishing, forestry and related products 8,952 0.38 
Petroleum products, fuel, electricity and other sources of energy 44,654 1.88 
Mining, basic metals and related products 4,857 0.20 
Food, beverages, tobacco and related products 98,641 4.15 
Agricultural machinery 2,730 0.11 
Clothing, footwear, luggage articles and accessories 15,869 0.67 
Leather and textile fabrics, plastic and rubber materials 4,010 0.17 
Printed matter and related products 16,424 0.69 
Chemical products 17,875 0.75 
Office and computing machinery, equipment and supplies except furniture and 
software packages 
46,499 1.96 
Electrical machinery, apparatus, equipment and consumables; Lighting 18,878 0.79 
Radio, television, communication, telecommunication and related equipment 12,356 0.52 
Medical equipment, pharmaceuticals and personal care products 771,803 32.45 
Transport equipment and auxiliary products to transportation 74,890 3.15 
Security, fire-fighting, police and defence equipment 8,708 0.37 
Musical instruments, sport goods, games, toys, handicraft, art materials and 
accessories 
4,085 0.17 
Laboratory, optical and precision equipments (excl. glasses) 33,632 1.41 
Furniture (incl. office furniture), furnishings, domestic appliances (excl. lighting) 
and cleaning products 
47,527 2.00 
Collected and purified water 434 0.02 
Industrial machinery 15,370 0.65 
Machinery for mining, quarrying, construction equipment 6,128 0.26 
Construction structures and materials; auxiliary products to construction 
(excepts electric apparatus) 
34,711 1.46 
Construction work 270,515 11.37 
Software package and information systems 11,723 0.49 
Repair and maintenance services 69,893 2.94 
Installation services (except software) 1,299 0.05 
Hotel, restaurant and retail trade services 14,732 0.62 
Transport services (excl. Waste transport) 95,938 4.03 
Supporting and auxiliary transport services; travel agencies services 4,676 0.20 
Postal and telecommunications services 18,736 0.79 
Public utilities 5,165 0.22 
Financial and insurance services 59,150 2.49 
Real estate services 3,372 0.14 
Architectural, construction, engineering and inspection services 95,656 4.02 
IT services: consulting, software development, Internet and support 41,439 1.74 
Research and development services and related consultancy services 7,968 0.34 
Administration, defence and social security services 5,271 0.22 
Services related to the oil and gas industry 888 0.04 
Agricultural, forestry, horticultural, aquacultural and apicultural services 62,789 2.64 
Business services: law, marketing, consulting, recruitment, printing and security 81,213 3.41 
Education and training services 57,102 2.40 
Health and social work services 56,833 2.39 
Sewage-, refuse-, cleaning-, and environmental services 107,701 4.53 
Recreational, cultural and sporting services 7,243 0.30 
Other community, social and personal services 10,114 0.43 
Total 2,378,449 100 
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Table D6. Distribution of contracts by country, 2009-2014, EU27 plus Norway 
Country 
code 
N Percent 
AT 15,082 0.63 
BE 31,429 1.32 
BG 33,423 1.40 
CY 4,872 0.20 
CZ 28,036 1.18 
DE 157,993 6.63 
DK 25,676 1.08 
EE 7,308 0.31 
ES 111,705 4.69 
FI 34,034 1.43 
FR 725,636 30.47 
GR 16,709 0.70 
HR 4,058 0.17 
HU 28,177 1.18 
IE 14,183 0.60 
IT 102,286 4.30 
LT 32,905 1.38 
LU 3,543 0.15 
LV 56,148 2.36 
NL 28,772 1.21 
NO 16,786 0.70 
PL 547,373 22.98 
PT 10,386 0.44 
RO 86,917 3.65 
SE 43,152 1.81 
SI 33,721 1.42 
SK 12,965 0.54 
UK 168,192 7.06 
Total 2,381,467 100.00 
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ANNEX E – RED FLAG DEFINITIONS 
Table E1. Lack of call for tenders publication in TED red flags by country, 
2009-2014, EU27 plus Norway 
Country 
code 
NO Call for Tenders 
publication is red flag 
AT Yes 
BE Yes 
BG No 
CY Yes 
CZ Yes 
DE Yes 
DK No 
EE No 
ES No 
FI Yes 
FR Yes 
GR Yes 
HR Yes 
HU Yes 
IE Yes 
IT Yes 
LT No 
LU Yes 
LV Yes 
NL Yes 
NO Yes 
PL Yes 
PT Yes 
RO Yes 
SE Yes 
SI Yes 
SK Yes 
UK Yes 
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Table E2. Non-open procedure type red flags by country, 2009-2014, EU27 plus Norway 
Country 
Code 
Accelerated 
negotiated 
Accelerated 
restricted 
Award 
without 
publication 
Competitive 
dialogue 
Negotiated with 
competition 
Negotiated 
without 
competition 
Open Restricted Missing/error 
AT Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No No No 
BE Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No No No 
BG No No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No 
CY No No No No No No No No No 
CZ Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No No No 
DE Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No 
DK No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
EE Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes 
ES Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No No No 
FI No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No 
FR Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No No 
GR No No No No No No No No No 
HR No No No No No No No Yes No 
HU Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No No 
IE No No No Yes Yes No No No No 
IT Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes No 
LT No No No No Yes Yes No No No 
LU No No No No No No No No No 
LV No No Yes No Yes Yes No No No 
NL Yes No Yes No No Yes No No No 
NO Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No No No 
PL Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No 
PT No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
RO Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No No No 
SE No No No No No Yes No No No 
SI Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No No No 
SK Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No No 
UK No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No 
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Table E3. Advertisement period thresholds red flags by country, 
number of calendar days, 2009-2014, EU27 plus Norway 
Country 
code 
red flag not red flag 
is 
“missing” 
red flag 
AT 0-20;34-47 21-33;48-  
BE 18-34;78-  Yes 
BG 0-28;35- 29-34  
CY 0-46;53-60 47-52;61-  
CZ 0-50 51-  
DE 
 
  
DK 52-61 0-51;62-  
EE 0-32;50-57 33-49;58-  
ES 39-42;52- 0-38;43-51  
FI 0-39;52- 40-51  
FR 0-40 41-  
GR 0-54 55-  
HR 0-40;49- 41-48  
HU 
 
  
IE 41- 0-40  
IT 0-47 48-  
LT 40-42;48- 0-39;43-47  
LU 51-54;86- 0-50;55-85  
LV 0-40;51-57 41-50;58-  
NL 0-38;48-56 39-47;57-  
NO 
36-42;50-
56 
0-35;43-
49;57- 
 
PL 0-25;43- 26-42  
PT 0-42 43-  
RO 41-50 0-40;51-  
SE 
 
  
SI 51- 0-50  
SK 49-52 0-48;53-  
UK 0-53 54-  
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Table E4. Decision period thresholds red flags by country, number of 
calendar days, 2009-2014, EU27 plus Norway 
Country 
code 
red flag 
not red 
flag 
is “missing” 
red flag 
AT 0-56 57- Yes 
BE 0-22 23-  
BG 0-27;120- 28-119  
CY 0-90 91-  
CZ 0-147 148-  
DE 0-36 37- Yes 
DK 
0-39;124-
168 
40-123  
EE 0-41 42- Yes 
ES 0-43 44-  
FI 0-65;92-127 66-91;128-  
FR 0-66;156- 67-155  
GR 0-170 171-  
HR 0-26 27-  
HU 0-46;73-104 47-72;104-  
IE 0-50;87- 51-86  
IT 0-200 201-  
LT 0-32 33-  
LU 0-52 53-  
LV 0-20;106- 21-105  
NL 0-34;58- 35-57  
NO 0-70;98-229 71-97;230-  
PL 0-63 64- Yes 
PT 0-63;243- 64-242  
RO 0-56 57- Yes 
SE 0-44;89- 45-88  
SI 0-51;77- 52-76  
SK 0-68 69-  
UK 
0-35;165-
304 
36-
164;305- 
 
 
 
46 
 
 
Table E5. Non-quantitative assessment criteria weight red flags by 
country, number of calendar days, 2009-2014, EU27 plus 
Norway 
Countr
y code 
red flag not red flag 
AT 0-39;61-100 40-60 
BE 0-30;71-100 31-70 
BG “Lowest price”  
CY 
 
 
CZ 
“Most economically advantageous 
tender” 
 
DE 0-47;66-100 48-65 
DK 66-100 0-65 
EE 11-40;71-100 0-10;41-70 
ES “Lowest price”  
FI 0-20;56-100 21-55 
FR 0-35 36-100 
GR 
“Most economically advantageous 
tender” 
 
HR “lowest price”  
HU 60-92 0-59;93-100 
IE 21-40 0-20;41-100 
IT 0-65 66-100 
LT 0-40;61-100 41-60 
LU “Lowest price”  
LV 61-100 0-60 
NL 0-55 56-100 
NO 0-20 21-100 
PL 0-40 41-100 
PT “Lowest price”  
RO 0-49 50-100 
SE 20-30 0-19;31-100 
SI 0-15;26-60 16-25;61-100 
SK “Lowest price”  
UK 0-45;71-100 46-70 
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